The purpose of this study was to determine the constraints Imposed on the FED/INTOR fusion planta by tritium contamination In the reactor hall. Limitations Imposed by gamma-radiation levels and the maintenance philosophy adopted were Included. The coBt (capital and operating) required to maintain 5, 50,and 500 uCl/n was evaluated. Three different maintenance strategies (unsulted worker, suited worker and robotics) were studied to determine if tritium contamination placed a constraint on reactor availability.
I. INTRODUCTION
tn a deuterium-tritium fueled fusion reactor, the control of tritium is an Important ltsue since tritium contamination in the reactor hall Is a potential problem. Several areas are affected by the tritium levels maintained in the hall atmosphere during different scenarios -reactor operation, maintenance, accident, ^he environmental Impact and the psrceived public risk are Important In the public domain. For the plant worker, the dose received and the associated worker efficiency can be significant. A major economic issue Is the capital and operating costs associated with the atmospheric detrltlation systems needed to maintain a given level. The delay time needed to achieve tritium and/or gamma radiation levels associated with a given maintenance philosophy is a major constraint in achieving a desired reactor availability.
In this study, the effects of tritium contamination in the reactor were evaluated for the FED/INTOR designs (Fusion Engineering Devices/International Tokaaak Reactor) including all the above considerations. The magnitude of the tritium leak rate or release possible fron trltlun systems In the reactor hall was evaluated for the different operating conditions considered -normal, accident, maintenance. Since FED/INTOR are preconceptual reactor designs, detailed specifications were not available. Therefore ranges were used in evaluating the tritium sources. Capital and operating costs Involved In maintaining a given tcltlum atmospheric level (5, 50 and 500 pCl/m ) were evaluated for a continuous tritium leak rate and for a release. Correlations were made between a given tritium atmospheric level and the environmental release, the worker dose, the worker efficiency, and the reactor availability for a given maintenance philosophy. When the gatnaa radiation level was a limitation, this waa factored into reactor availability considerations.
II. TRITIUM SOURCE TERMS
The approach used to asBess the magnitude of the tritium source terms was to assume that all tritium systems were fabricated and operated according to established tritium handling practices.
The additional assumption was made that individual components had minimal leaks. I.e., that they were well designed and had been leak tested under stringent conditions. With these constraints, systems which could serve as models for various components within the reactor were analyzed and then sized to approximate the FED/INVOR configuration. In all cases, a range of values resulted because of the uncertainties In the data base. Strategies which could result In lower tritium source terms were Incorporated when possible.
The tritium source terns considered in the reactor hall were the following: water coolant system, torus Including first wa 1, limlter/divertor and blanket sections, diagnostic system, sputtered carbon particles, fuelers, blanket tritium recovery lines, test modules, vacuum pumps, and wall surfaces. It was assumed that both the ventilation system and atmosphere detrltlation system were in a separate building and thus the waste products (filters, molecular aleve beds) were not source terms. If this were not true, Chen these systems would also be source tens.
Of the source terms considered, the one which cculd contribute the greatest tritium load during corral operation was the water coolant system. The coolant system In the CANDU reactors In Canada was considered to approximate the water coolant system In a fusion reactor. Acute spillage cited for CANDU plants was assumed to correspond to aajor coolant accident releases In the fusion reactor hall. Remaining spillage was considered to be representative of maintenance operations. Two sepsrate coolant systems -one for areas of high tritium contamination and the other for those of low tritium contaminationwere recommended to minimize the volume of coolant with a potentially high tritium concentration. These systems also reduced the •lie and cost of the water detrltlatlon system required.
The average tritium leak rate from the water coolant was estimated to be < 12 Ci/d during reactor operation, < 70 Ci/d during maintenance and < 4000 Cl/d for accident conditions. A •umnary of all leak sources la shown in Table 1 The walla of the reactor hall can be a •ajor contribution to atmospheric tritium levels during reactor operation. Experience at Ontario Hydro 3 Indicates that concrete walls serve as a sink for any tritium released during maintenance or accident conditions. This la then released when atmospheric tritium levels are reduced. (Four days at ~ 0.7 Volt/ rain are required to reduce levels.) The recommendation Is made that a non-permeable metal liner (stainless steel or aluminum) be used in the reactor hall.
III. ATMOSPHERIC DETKITIATION SYSTEMS
Large volume air detrltlatlon systems were evaluated on the basis of conceptual design, capital cost, operating cost, and system requirements for both operating and accident conditions. An air detrltlatlon system consists of the following main pieces of equipment: blower, air preheater, catalytic reactor aftercooler, and water removal system. The system design is based on make-up air and exhaust being equal to one volume percent per day to maintain negative pressure In the reactor hall. There would also be an emergency detrltlatlon system that would be employed when accident conditions arose to Increase the total capacity of the system and thereby reduce the time required to cleanup a release.
The proposed conceptual design took into consideration three existing detrltiatlon systems. Hound's system has a capacity of ~ 28 a /min and uses activated alumina beda for water removal. Both the TFTR systea at Princeton and the system at LASL use molecular sieve dryer beds to remove water. A designed, but not yet oullt, system at LLL with a «• 140 m /min capacity wai also considered.
Total cost for reactor building decrltiatlon la divided into two categories: total capital cost and annual operating expenses> Total capital cosr la the sum of the detrltlatlon system cost, the cost of the building to contain tha ayatea, and the cost of a trltiated water recovery unit capable of handling 100 L/d. The detrltlatlon systea costs were obtained by scaling Che cost of the TFTR Vault Cleanup System. Building costs were estimated at $230/a , with the building volume required to contain the de filiation system scaled froa the present system at Hound. The cost for the water recovery unit -jae estimated to be S5M. The total coaC for an ~ 140 • J /aln unit la 9.9 H$.
The size of the detrltlatlon ayatea la an The total capital cost of the Atmospheric Detrttlatlon System Is shown as a function of the average operational release rate in the reactor building in Table 2 . Total capital costs rise rapidly with increasing leak rates. For an accident case, the total capital cost is shown in Table 3 . Operating costs are shown in Table 4 Howaver, with Halted manpower, the availability expected would be lower. To deternine the range of this value the assumptions made were that 10, IS, 20, and 30Z of the total maintenance time per year was dedicated to operations which required ~ 24 hours to coaplete with unlimited manpower. Since, with limited manpower, twice the time was required for each one day Job requiring contact maintenance/repair, the availability possible was 0Z (if 30Z of the nalnteiance/repair tasks were one day Jobs), 4Z (If 20Z were one day Jobs), 8Z (If 1SZ were one day Jobs) and 12Z (if 10Z were one day Jobs). The availability shown in Table 5 for limited manpower was for the 1SZ option which corresponded to once a week.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Since the water coolant system was a major source of tritium leakage to the reactor hall, aeparate coolant ayiteu were recommended for the first wall/Halter, for the blanket and for the shield eystems to minimixe the volume of coolant with potentially high tritium concantratlon. Maintenance operation required the largest ataospharic datrltlatlon
